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Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration
LISSA GRIFFIN* & ELLEN YAROSHEFSKYt
ABSTRACT
Over the past few years, scholars, legislators, and politicians have come to
recognize that our current state of "mass incarceration" is the result of serious
dysfunction in our criminal justice system. As a consequence, there has been
significant attention to the causes of mass incarceration. These include the war
on drugs and political decisions based on a "law and order" perspective.
Congressional and state legislative enactments increased the financing of the
expansion of police powers and provided for severely punitive sentencing
statutes, thereby giving prosecutors uniquely powerful weapons in securing
guilty pleas. All of this occurred as crime rates dropped.
Where were the lawyers when our criminal justice system was evolving into a
system of mass incarceration? Surprisingly, in looking for the causes and cures
for the mass incarceration state, very little, if any, attention has been paid to the
role of the most powerful actor in the criminal justice system: the prosecutor It is
the prosecutor who exercises virtually unreviewable discretion in seeking
charges, determining bail, negotiating a resolution, and fixing the sentence. Now,
however there is data that identifies aggressive prosecutorial charging practices
as the major cause of the explosion in our prison population. That is, over the
past twenty years prosecutors have brought felony charges in more cases than
ever before, resulting in a dramatic increase in prison admissions. If prosecuto-
rial charging practices have been a major cause of the universally recognized
mass incarceration problem, what should be done? How does the role of the
prosecutor need to change to prevent a continuation, or a worsening, of our mass
incarceration problem?
This Article examines the recognized role of the prosecutor as a "minister of
justice," and makes a range of suggested changes to the prosecution function.
These include re-calibrating the minister of justice and advocacy role balance in
recognition of the current mass incarceration crisis; enacting measures to ensure
independence from law enforcement in the charging function; collecting cur-
rently non-existent, objective data that breaks down and memorializes available
information on each decision to charge as well as its consequences; and drafting
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written charging procedures and policies based on the collection of that
data-driven information.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, scholars, lawyers, government officials, and policymakers
have come to recognize that our criminal justice system is seriously dysfunc-
tional.' Documented symptoms include the disproportionate punishment of
1. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1313 (2012); K. Babe Howell,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 285, 290, 300 (2014) [hereinafter Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion].
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indigent people of color;2 the lack of meaningful public defense funding; 3 the
continuing identification of wrongful convictions;4 the detention of defendants
who do not have money to satisfy bail conditions;5 internationally unprec-
edented, severe sentences, including the mandatory minimums that may result in
questionable guilty pleas 6 and often require judges to impose excessively harsh
sentences;7 the "plea mill" system in misdemeanor courts;" and the destructive
social impact of collateral consequences. 9 In recent years, particular attention has
been paid to a larger issue: the problem of "mass incarceration." 0 Repeatedly, we
learn that the United States contains "five percent of the world's population" and
"houses over twenty percent of its prisoners."" There is no shortage of
explanations for this shocking condition. Some blame the war on drugs1 2 or the
2. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn, The Effects of the Offender's Race, Ethnicity, and Sex on Federal Sentencing
Outcomes in the Guidelines Era, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 92 (2013); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering
Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 726-27 (2005); William T. Pizzi et al., Discrimination in Sentencing on the Basis
of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327, 328, 342 (2005); Joe Palazzolo, Racial Gap in
Men's Sentencing, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788
7324432004578304463789858002 [https://perma.ccl3UW2-DD8P].
3. See generally Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2013)
[hereinafter Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System].
4. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org [https://perma.cclGSR5-5ZZF] (last visited
Feb. 17,2017); Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. et al., THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OFEXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.
edu/speciallexoneration/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/6J44-7CCH] (last visited Apr. 5, 2017); Daniel
Denvir, The Long Ugly History of "Law and Order" Candidates, CITYLAB (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.citylab.
com/politics/2015/09/the-long-ugly-history-of-law-and-order-candidates/405709/ [https://perma.cc/3MHS-
7ZQJ].
5. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1301 (2012); Matthew J. Hegreness, America's Fundamental and
Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909 (2013); JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD
END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 3-4 (Sept. 2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/
justicepolicy/documents/bailfail executivesummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ8Z-68FE]; Bail: Last Week To-
night with John Oliver (HBO), YouTUBE (June 7, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IS5mwymTIJU
[https://perma.cc/KC4Y-8U5P].
6. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (plea bargaining "effectively
compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense"); Kyle Graham,
Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 722-23 (2014); Jackelyn Klatte, Current Development, Guilty as
Pleaded: How Appellate Waivers in Plea Bargaining Implicate Prosecutorial Ethics Concerns, 28 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 643, 646-47 (2015).
7. See Anjelica Cappellino & John Meringolo, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Pursuit of Fair
and Just Sentences, 77 ALB. L. REV. 771, 812 (2014).
8. See Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, supra note 3, at 1093-94.
9. See MARGARET COLGATE-LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS, & CECELIA KLINGELE, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013); David S. Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Juvenile Arrest
and Collateral Educational Damage in the Transition to Adulthood, 86 Soc. EDUc. 36, 38 (2013).
10. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JI CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2012); Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1.
11. E.g., John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited Legislative
Options, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 173 (2015) [hereinafter Pfaff, The War on Drugs].
12. Id.
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new Jim Crow. 13 Some blame the cultivated politics of fear, even as crime rates
dropped.1 4 Others, relying in part on the culture of fear, blame Congress and the
state legislatures for enacting severe sentencing statutes-longer sentences,
mandatory minimums-that increased the severity of our already punitive
sentencing scheme and gave prosecutors uniquely powerful weapons in securing
guilty pleas.1 5 Some blame increased financing for the expansion of police
powers and prisons.1 6  Others blame outright over-criminalization.1 7  Others
blame the privatization of prisons" or increased parole violations.9
But surprisingly, in looking for the causes (and cures) for the mass incarcera-
tion state, very little, if any, attention has been paid to the role of the most
powerful party in the criminal justice system: the prosecutor. 2 0 As is well known,
prosecutors in the United States have dual roles, both constitutionally and
ethically: prosecutors are ministers of justice and advocates. The prosecutor's
role as minister of justice is well recognized, although not clearly described or
defined. 21 But it is well accepted that the prosecutor is a fiduciary who represents
the sovereign and must make decisions for society at large-not for any
individual client.2 2 As famously articulated in Berger v. United States,
13. See ALEXANDER, supra note 10; Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425
(1997) (discussing the implications of traffic stops of people of color); see also Rich Juzwiak & Aleksander
Chan, Unarmed People of Color Killed by Police, 1999-2014, GAWKER (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:15 PM),
http://gawker.com/unarmed-people-of-color-killed-by-police-1999-2014-1666672349 [https://perma.cc/YZ45-
EVNS] (documenting police shootings of unarmed people of color as evidence of continuing racism).
14. See, e.g., Michael C. Campbell & Heather Schoenfeld, The Transformation ofAmerica's Penal Order: A
Historicized Political Sociology ofPunishment, 118 AM. J. Soc. 1375, 1380 n.7 (2013).
15. But see John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. UNIv. L. REV. 1239,
1242-44 (2012) [hereinafter Pfaff, Causes ofPrison Growth].
16. See, e.g., Julia Bowling, The Crime Bill's Legacy, Two Decades Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 2,
2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/crime-bills-legacy-two-decades-later [https://perma.cc/RA4U-
XFXJ].
17. See CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, ROADMAP FOR PROSECUTOR REFORM 5 (2013), http://www.
prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/WhitePaper-RoadmapProsecutorReform.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DY
F-UWRV] (noting, in addition, that "[o]ne consequence of over-criminalization is over-prosecution, i.e.,
charging persons with a crime in the absence of probable cause").
18. See generally PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION (Tara Herivel & Paul
Wright eds., 2007).
19. See generally DANIEL P. MEARS & JOSHUA C. COCHRAN, PRISON REENTRY IN THE ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 31-40 (2015). But see Pfaff, Causes ofPrison Growth, supra note 15, at 15-16.
20. Many scholars have described the prosecutor as the "most powerful actor[] in the criminal justice
system." Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 286-87; see also Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous
Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151, 154-55 (2011) [hereinafter Gershman, The
Zealous Prosecutor] (discussing the unique role of the prosecutor and advocating for explicit ethical
guidelines); Daniel C. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-506, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2757811 [https://perma.cc/8EVX-
32Q7] [hereinafter Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors].
21. Professor Bennett Gershman described it as "maddeningly vague and frustratingly amorphous."
Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor, supra note 20, at 155.
22. Fred Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44
VAND. L. REV. 45, 57 (1991) ("The notion that a prosecutor sometimes should refrain from acting as a pure
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[T]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.2 3
This fundamental concept is articulated in both case law and ethical codes in all
jurisdictions.
It is the prosecutor who exercises virtually unreviewable discretion in seeking
charges, determining bail, negotiating a resolution, and, ultimately, fixing a
sentence. What is the prosecutor's role in creating mass incarceration? Or, as
some scholars have asked, where were the lawyers when our criminal justice
system was evolving into a fast track to mass incarceration? 25 Where were the
prosecutors when we became a mass incarceration state?
One study, demonstrably debunking other theories, has addressed this
question, in part, by identifying a previously unexamined major cause of the
explosion in our prison population: aggressive prosecutorial charging practices.2 6
That study demonstrates that over the past twenty years, prosecutors have
brought felony charges in a dramatically increased number of cases, resulting in a
remarkable increase in prison admissions.2 7 This Article moves forward from that
information. We ask: if prosecutorial charging practices have been a major cause
of the universally recognized mass incarceration problem, what should be done?
It is time to reflect on how this happened and to propose change. There is a
substantial body of literature that argues that changes in the criminal justice
process can best be achieved internally, by internal guidelines or by otherwise
changing the cultures of the various players in the process-judiciary, defense,
advocate stems from the fact that she has no single client. The prosecutor is simultaneously responsible for the
community's protection, victims' desire for vengeance, defendants' entitlement to a fair opportunity for
vindication, and the state's need for a criminal justice system that is efficient and appears fair. Described
accurately, the prosecutor represents 'constituencies'-and several of them at one time.") (citations omitted)
[hereinafter Zacharias, Ethics ofProsecutorial Trial Practice].
23. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
24. See, e.g., id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2016) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice and not simply that of an advocate.").
25. Alec Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure ofAmerican Lawyers, 128 HARv. L.
REv. 253 (2015).
26. Pfaff, The War on Drugs, supra note 11, at 198; Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 15, at 3, 13.
But cf Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens ofMass Incarceration, MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power] (critiquing Pfaff's data and arguing
that legislators and judges have a greater responsibility for mass incarceration).
27. Pfaff, Causes ofPrison Growth, supra note 15, at 3. Of course, felony charges did not uniformly increase
in all jurisdictions. See, e.g., PREETI CHAUHAN ET AL., TRACKING ENFORCEMENT RATES IN NEW YORK CITY,
2003-2014, at 10 (2015) ("The number of felony arrests started at a low of 85,221 in 1980, increased to a peak
of 147,543 in 1989, and then dipped back down to 89,306 by 2014, close to the 1980 level.") [hereinafter
CHAUHAN ET AL., ENFORCEMENT RATES IN NEW YORK CITY].
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and prosecution-rather than through external judicial or legislative directives. 28
In this Article, we take aim at the culture surrounding prosecutorial decisions to
charge and argue that, in light of what we now know about the causes and
possible cure of the problem of mass incarceration, that culture must change. In
short, prosecutors should: (1) re-calibrate the minister of justice charging role in
recognition of the current mass incarceration crisis; (2) ensure independence
from and accountability from the police; (3) create charging procedures and
policies based on objective, data-driven information; and (4) maintain accurate
and complete data about the decision to charge and its consequences.
Part I of this Article describes the mass incarceration problem and the increase
in felony charging, and addresses some of the possible causes of this charging
pattern. Part II analyzes the prosecutor's role in charging, including the
dimensions of the prosecutor's interests of justice role, both generally and
specifically with respect to the exercise of charging discretion. Part III makes
suggestions for change that would include: (1) a recalibration of the minister of
justice role in the charging function, in recognition of the current mass
incarceration crisis; (2) a requirement that prosecutors achieve greater indepen-
dence from law enforcement in the charging function, in part through the use of
written standards, checklists, and forms; (3) the collection of currently non-
existent objective data; and (4) the creation of written charging procedures and
policies based on that data.
I. THE MASS INCARCERATION PROBLEM AND THE PROSECUTOR
There may be no better way to describe the problem of mass incarceration than
to quote what has by now become a clich6: "with only 5 percent of the world's
population, the United States is now home to nearly 25 percent of its prisoners." 2 9
After fifty years of stability ending in the 1970s, the prison population quintupled
from 100 per 100,000 in the 1970s to nearly 500 per 100,000 in 2008, with 1.6
million total prisoners.30
A most convincing empirical study about the causes of this prison explosion
debunks the "standard story." 3 1 While the war on drugs and increased severity of
28. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing Discretionary Justice, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 167, 169, 196-97 (2004) [hereinafter Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines].
See generally Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 1-3 (discussing why the prosecutor is
well-equipped to bring about institutional change and rejecting alternatives).
29. Pfaff, The War on Drugs, supra note 11, at 173.
30. Id.; see also K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 271, 272 n.1 (2009) [hereinafter Howell,
Broken Lives from Broken Windows].
31. Pfaff, The War on Drugs, supra note 11, at 179-84. Professor Pfaff has written several articles reflecting
his findings. See John F Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom on Prison
Growth is Wrong, and Where We Can Go From Here, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 265, 265-67 (2014) [hereinafter
Pfaff, Escaping the Standard Story]; see also John F. Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical Review
306 [Vol. 30:301
MINISTERS OF JUSTICE AND MASS INCARCERATION
sentencing laws may have indirectly contributed,3 2 the predominant cause of the
prison explosion is that, despite the drop in crime, prosecutors have brought and
are bringing felony charges in more cases than ever before.33 That is, more people
are being charged with felonies that result in prison admissions than in the past,
notwithstanding a falling crime rate. This connection between prosecutorial
charging practices and the explosion in prison admissions is corroborated by the
fact that, over the same time period, and despite more severe sentencing options,
the average prison stay has remained relatively constant while the number of
prison admissions-people convicted of felonies-has exploded.34 The conclu-
sion is that the quintupling of the prison population over the last forty years has
resulted from an increased number of felony filings per arrest.35 This is also
confirmed by data that demonstrates that had felony filings remained constant,
prison admissions in 2008 would have been approximately thirty-six percent
below their actual level.3 6 In short, "[p]rison growth has been driven by
admissions, and at least since the early 1990s admissions have been driven by
prosecutorial filing decisions." 3 7
Determining why prosecutors have been so aggressive in bringing felony
charges is much harder. There is no data that can pinpoint a single cause for this
prosecutorial charging pattern, although it is definitely not the increase in crime,
which stopped in the early 1990s. 3 8 But it is possible to identify several possible
causes: the increase in violent and property crimes before 1991; the political and
social upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s; broken windows policing strategies and
the resulting misdemeanor crises; and increasingly punitive sentencing legisla-
tion, including the expansion of mandatory minimum sentences.
A. INCREASES IN VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIMES BEFORE 1991
There is no question that the crime rate rose from 1960 to 1991. During
that period, violent crime grew by 371 percent and property crime by 198
and Path Forward, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2008) (setting forth a comparative analysis of
methodology used in empirical literature).
32. See Pfaff, Escaping the Standard Story, supra note 31, at 265, 267 (the percent of prisoners serving
drug-related sentences peaked in 1990 at twenty-two percent; by 2010 the portion of state prisoners serving time
for drug offenses was just over seventeen percent).
33. Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 15, at 1241.
34. Id. at 1241-42.
35. Id. at 1239, 1245.
36. Id. at 1251.
37. Id. at 1254. But cf Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power, supra note 26 (critiquing this conclusion
and arguing that legislators and judges have more responsibility for the prison explosion than prosecutors).
38. See Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 15, at 1254. Crime rates steadily declined from 1991 to
2010, with violent crime falling by forty-eight percent and property crime by forty-three percent. Nevertheless,
as we suggest above, it may be that the increase in felony charges is due in part to the fact that as more
individuals have prior misdemeanor convictions, prosecutors are more likely to charge a felony. This phenomenon
could in turn be driven by policing policies that increased the number of misdemeanor arrests. See infra Part I.C.
2017] 307
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percent.3 9 At the same time, however, the effective incarceration rate declined.4 0
This certainly could have led to a sense that the criminal justice process was not
working, and thus could have contributed to a change in attitude toward
punishment,41 hardening attitudes, at least in the 1990s, about appropriate
punishment. Nevertheless, twenty-five years have passed with a declining crime
rate and without meaningful re-examination of the actual facts or of the punitive
attitude or its consequences.
B. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FORCES
From an interdisciplinary perspective, experts who study the sociology of
crime and crime control point to an increasingly punitive political and social
trajectory that began in response to the social and cultural upheaval of the
1960s.42 As traditional social controls seemed to be disintegrating, for example,
through racial integration and the sexual revolution, anxiety led to a publicly and
politically perceived need for greater social control.43 That anxiety provided the
impetus for the political rhetoric of crime control. And because the social anxiety
rested in part on the perceived threat from the civil rights movement, that is, the
perception that racial boundaries were breaking down, the new punitiveness had
an implicit racial basis.t Then, as crime rates began to rise in the 1970s the
perceived, or politically enhanced, need for stability was further exploited by
"law and order" political platforms. 4 5
Coincidentally, the women's and victims' rights movements of the time fed the
call for increasing punishment by coalescing behind increasingly punitive
solutions to perceived inequalities in the criminal justice system, as opposed to
other more inclusive, less punitive approaches. Advocates thus supported
measures that made it easier to convict, leading to the creation of new crimes,
increasingly punitive sentencing legislation, and harsher sentencing practices.
Other forces inadvertently contributing to the carceral state were the anti-death
39. Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 15, at 1245-46.
40. Id. at 1264.
41. See id.
42. For a complete discussion of this phenomenon, see MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND
THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2015) [hereinafter GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT]; LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS
OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL (2010); VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS
OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS (2009);
NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRA-
cIFs (2008); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN
AMERICA (2006) [hereinafter GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS].
43. See generally People & Events: The Pill and the Sexual Revolution, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/
pill/peopleevents/e revolution.html [https://perma.cc/ZM8A-QZVJ] (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
44. See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT, supra note 42, at 2-6.
45. See GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS, supra note 42, at 9-12. Examples of other "law and
order" platform planks include expanded use of the death penalty and "three strikes" laws mandatory minimum
sentencing structures. Id. at 22-24.
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penalty and prison reform movements, that each somehow made lengthy
imprisonment seem like a reasonable-or even humane-sentencing alternative.46
Unfortunately, in the 1990s, as the crime rate began its twenty-five-year
downward trajectory, the seeds of the carceral state were already sown. Then, of
course, the "war on crime" dominated political discourse, with its underlying
focus on cultural control, again with exclusionary, racially discriminatory results.
Later, despite the drop in crime, politicians still played to fear of crime, the values
of exclusion rather than inclusion, and the need for social control,47 all of which
continued to target minorities. This resulted in the legislation of new and more
punitive tools-more crimes and more severe sentences. This increased the
pressure upon prosecutors to charge more people with crimes and to request more
severe sentences.
C. BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING AND THE MISDEMEANOR CRISIS
One measure that arose during this period was "broken windows policing,"
which was first described in 198248 and came into vogue shortly thereafter. It is a
method of policing based on the premise that public disorder leads to a
breakdown in informal social control mechanisms, which in turn results in more
serious crime.4 9 Pursuant to this policy, police focus on making arrests for minor
crimes before serious crime has a chance to grow, through a policy called "zero
tolerance policing."50 The result, of course, has been a major increase in arrests
for less serious, victimless offenses, in particular, misdemeanors.5 ' Ten million
non-felony cases are filed each year and the vast majority of convictions in the
United States are for misdemeanors.52 Since the 1980s, zero tolerance policing
has resulted in subjecting over ten million people to the lower criminal courts per
year.5 3
46. See id. at 9-12, 165-67, 231.
47. See id. at 74.
48. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
49. See id. at 31-32.
50. See generally id. at 31-32, 34; see also generally Tim Newburn, Atlantic Crossings: 'Police Transfer'
and Crime Control in the USA and Britain, 4 PUNISHMENT & Soc. 165, 167 (2002); Bill Dixon, Zero-Tolerance:
The Hard Edge of Community Policing, AFR. SECURITY REV., July 2000, at 73 (describing the global growth of
zero tolerance policing).
51. Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows, supra note 30, at 273 & n.5 (citing FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, US DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Table 29: Estimated Number ofArrests, in CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
2005 (2006)) (noting that of 14 million arrests reported nationally to the FBI in 2005, only about 2.2 million
were for serious crimes).
52. See Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, supra note 3, at 1090 (77.5% of cases in study of courts
in seventeen jurisdictions were misdemeanors); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective
Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 281 (2011).
53. See Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 290.
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First, in the face of this explosion in the numbers of filed cases, it is fair to say
that the process for adjudicating misdemeanor charges has broken down to a
largely administrative processing mechanism, 54 characterized, in large measure,
by weak prosecutorial screening of police complaints. 5 Second, disturbing
patterns of discrimination and of a lack of justice have emerged: eighty-five to
ninety percent of the people processed in criminal courts are non-white, and
overburdened prosecutors are not able to properly exercise their ethical and
constitutional responsibility to determine who and what to charge. More broadly,
the sheer volume of cases has resulted in a lack of adjudication that is
characterized by unreliable determinations of culpability and failures of proce-
dural justice.5 7 What has resulted is a police-dominated charging process
followed by an administrative, not an adjudicative, process, which results not in
administrative sanctions but in criminal penalties.5" Third, while punishments for
minor crimes are intended to be small, the collateral consequences of a
misdemeanor conviction-"loss of home, income, employment, immigration
status, or ability to pay for an education"-have resulted in well-documented,
criminogenic effects. 5 9 And these serious consequences have disproportionately
impacted minority communities. 0
Finally, the misdemeanor crisis has had a serious impact on the innocent.
Given the breadth of prosecutorial discretion 6 2 and limited defense discovery,6 3
the innocent are particularly vulnerable to the pressure to plead guilty, that is, to
avoid coming back to court and risking a substantial sentence, even where they
are not guilty. Those charged with misdemeanors are under tremendous pressure
to plead guilty to secure their freedom-whether the charges are accurate or
64
not. This results in the defendant having a criminal record; even if arrested
54. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2142
(1998) [hereinafter Lynch, Our Administrative System]; see Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at
290 nn.24-25.
55. See Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 294.
56. Id. at 298.
57. See generally Lynch, Our Administrative System, supra note 54.
58. See generally id.
59. Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows, supra note 30, at 300, 322.
60. See id. at 291-92.
61. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 1, at 1319. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "Even
prosecutors acknowledge that the likelihood of innocent individuals pleading guilty is substantial." Howell,
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1 at 291 (citing Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463, 2506 (2004)).
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2463, 2495
(2004) ("The result of inadequate discovery is that the parties bargain blindfolded .... Prosecutorial bluffing is
more likely to work particularly well against innocent defendants, who are on average more risk averse than
guilty defendants."); see also Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1043 (2013). See generally AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: How AMERICA HOLDS COuRE (2009).
64. See Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 1; Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, supra note 3.
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again for a misdemeanor, that record is likely to lead to higher charges, a reduced
willingness of the prosecution to offer a good plea bargain, and a longer or
harsher sentence. Ultimately, a record of misdemeanors will lead to felony
charges, because people who already have a record of misdemeanor convictions
are more likely to be charged with a felony in subsequent cases.
D. MORE SEVERE SENTENCING OPTIONS AND MANDATORY MINIMUM
SENTENCES
As noted above, one of the consequences of the political and social changes
was a call for tougher policies, including legislation that created mandatory
minimum sentences and sentencing guidelines that imposed longer prison
sentences.6 5 In the federal system, there are now over 170 crimes that carry
mandatory sentences, an increase of seventy-eight percent since 1991. At the
state level, mandatory minimum sentences exist for crimes that include drug
trafficking, assault on vulnerable victims, possession of a firearm during a felony,
gang felonies, carjacking, hate crimes, rape, sex offenses involving minors, and
habitual offender sentences. 6 Accordingly, the availability of mandatory mini-
mum sentences increased the leverage provided to the prosecutor in charging and
in plea negotiations. 7 And, of course, a prosecutor's decision to charge is not
subject to judicial review, effectively depriving the courts of any role in
limiting this use of the charging function. Indeed, available data shows that
the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing and the exploding prison
population coincide,6" even as the average length of a prison stay has
remained relatively constant.69
II. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE ROLE
Ultimately, the prosecutor is the party responsible for managing these social,
political, and legislative changes in the context of the criminal process. In this
context it is important to remember that the U.S. prosecutor is a quasi-judicial,
fiduciary representative of the sovereign whose responsibility is to be "a minister
of justice and not simply . . . an advocate."7 0 It is basic to the U.S. criminal
process that the prosecutor's interest is to "see that the defendant is accorded
65. For a complete discussion of the impact of mandatory minimum sentencing on the mass incarceration
problem, see generally R. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Support
Sentencing Reform, 45 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 981 (2014) [hereinafter Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice].
66. See Recent State-Level Reforms to Mandatory Minimum Laws, FAMM, http://famm.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/08/FS-List-of-State-Reforms-2.25.pdf [https://perma.cc/NTJ3-JAN6] (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
67. See Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice, supra note 65 at 1014 (noting that twenty-five percent of cases
involving mandatory minimum penalties were ultimately disposed of under an alternative statute).
68. See id. at 985-87.
69. Pfaff, Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 15, at 1243-44.
70. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
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procedural justice."7 The minister of justice role is not clearly defined: it has
long been said to lack specificity, enforceability, and meaning. 72 It is well
accepted, however, that the prosecutor is a fiduciary who represents the sovereign
and must make decisions in the public interest, for society at large-not any
individual client. 7 3 It is the unique role of both principal and agent that requires a
prosecutor to pursue the public interest.7 4 It is also important to recognize that the
prosecutor is the gatekeeper of the system, uniquely positioned to mediate
between the police and the judiciary and between the legislature and "the
criminal law in action."7 In this posture, the prosecutor plays "an outsized role"
in the U.S. criminal justice process. That role requires that the prosecutor
undertake prosecution in the public interest, ensure fair process, prevent
conviction of the innocent, and provide equal treatment to all of the people. In
our system, the prosecutor must do this because the prosecutor has the unique
power to ensure a just, equitable, and fair result.78
Of course, there often is a tension between the prosecutor's role as an
adversary bringing individuals charged with crimes before a court and that of the
other "multidimensional roles" of the prosecutor. Beyond the courtroom, the
prosecutor works "in community meetings, in consultations with the po-
lice, . . . in sentencing commission and legislative hearings, and in budget
meetings." 79 As Dan Medwed has observed, "institutional and professional
incentives in most prosecutorial offices are steadfastly aligned with the goal of
earning convictions-an ambition that does not invariably dovetail with the
minister-of-justice concept."o
A prosecutor's commitment to procedural justice encompasses prosecutorial
charging decisions, but despite the importance of this stage of the process,
prosecutors have virtually unreviewable discretion to decide who and what to
charge. Due process permits a prosecutor virtually unfettered discretion in
charging, with the sole exceptions for a constitutionally prohibited basis for the
71. Id.
72. Professor Bennett Gershman described it as "maddeningly vague and frustratingly amorphous."
Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor, supra note 20, at 155.
73. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 633-34
(1999) [hereinafter Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice].
74. Id.
75. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 5.
76. Id. at 3.
77. See Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice, supra note 73, at 613-15; see also STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.2(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n 4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter 2015
ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS].
78. See Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 12.
79. Kay L. Levine & Ronald F Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1121
(2013).
80. Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the
Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 45 (2009) [hereinafter Medwed, Prosecutor as Minister of
Justice].
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charging decision such as race, religion, or the exercise of First Amendment
rights."' The American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for the Prosecution
Function82 provide guidelines for considerations in charging-as well as for
guilty pleas and sentences-but these remain guidelines.8 3 Beyond articulating
broad goals and standards, the U.S. criminal process leaves the job of defining the
minister of justice role to the prosecutors themselves. Not surprisingly, one
consequence of virtually unfettered discretion in charging has been a significant
increase in indictments in an era when crime has decreased, thereby creating or at
least contributing to conditions for mass incarceration. 8 4 Such a result under-
mines legitimacy and confidence in the criminal justice system and is in sharp
contrast with a robust view of the role envisioned by the Standards."5 Those
standards, first adopted in 1971 under the leadership of Justice Lewis Powell, are
the result of a lengthy deliberative process among many stakeholders in the
criminal justice system, including state prosecutors, the U.S. Department of
Justice, public and private criminal defense lawyers and organizations, law
enforcement, and members of the judiciary. Repeatedly revised, these have
served as a detailed guide to practice. The Standards have reflected a consensus
of the views of representatives of all segments of the criminal justice system.
"Balanced representation is the goal." 6 The Standards have been cited by
various courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. 7
Despite the Standards and the underlying fundamental notion of fair and
ethical prosecution,"" the relationship between the minister of justice role and the
prosecutor's advocacy role remains unclear. Are these roles to be balanced
simultaneously? Or does the role of minister of justice dominate at certain stages
of the prosecution while the role of advocate dominates at others? What is the
appropriate role of the prosecutor at the charging stage?
81. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
82. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.1. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial
Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259 (2011).
83. See 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standards 3-4.2 to 3-4.4; see also H. Richard Uviller, The
Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148-50
(1978) (explaining the purpose of old section 3-3.9).
84. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.1.
86. Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2009, at 10, 14; Rory A. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution and Defense Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (2010-2011).
87. Little, supra note 86, at 1113.
88. MODEL RULES R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (prosecutorial responsibility as minister of justice carries special obligations
to see that defendant is afforded procedural justice and that guilt is decided on the basis of sufficient evidence);
United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 27 F.3d 439
("Given the significance of the prosecutor's charging and plea bargaining decisions, it would offend common
notions of justice to have them made on the basis of a dart throw, a coin toss or some other arbitrary or
capricious process.").
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Most recently, it has been argued that part and parcel of the prosecutor's
sovereign role as minister of justice is the obligation as an administrator of justice
to "pursue the public interest by promoting a just system as a government
official." 89 The obligation of administrator of justice would include (1) advocat-
ing for repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for most drug and
non-violent offenses; and (2) creating and publishing plea bargaining guidelines
to make sure that the discretion to bargain in the face of mandatory minimum
sentences is consistent and even-handed. 90
The central role of the prosecutor is reflected in the Standards, which define
the prosecutor as a quasi-judicial "problem solver," who "serves the public," and
has an obligation to "reform and improve the administration of criminal
justice" 91 through "policies and procedures ... [that] achieve fair, efficient, and
effective enforcement of the criminal law within the prosecutor's jurisdiction." 92
As an administrator of justice, the prosecutor has the explicit duty to "seek to
reform and improve the administration of criminal justice, and when inadequa-
cies or injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor's
attention, the prosecutor should stimulate and support efforts for remedial
action."9 3 Prosecutors cannot shrink from this responsibility by seeking justice in
individual cases, while simply hoping or expecting that overall systemic justice
will result.94
But even short of leading an effort at sentencing reform, the prosecutor's role
as administrator of justice plays out in daily discretionary decision-making. With
respect to charging, the Standards advise that the prosecutor "serves the public
interest and should act with integrity and balanced judgment to increase public
safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate severity, and
by exercising discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate circum-
stances." 95 Standard 3-1.2(e) specifically advises that the prosecutor
should be knowledgeable about, consider, and where appropriate develop or
assist in developing alternatives to prosecution or conviction ... and ... be
89. Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice, supra note 65, at 994.
90. Id.
91. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(f).
92. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-2.4(a).
93. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(f).
94. As noted above, a variety of scholars have identified the fact that our system of criminal justice has
become administrative rather than adjudicative. See, e.g., supra note 54. To the extent that this is true, of course,
the role of the prosecutor as administrator of justice has taken on new importance. Certainly, as far as the
criminal courts are concerned, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should reflect more than the balancing of
cost-benefit factors associated with an administrative state actor. To the extent that this is the case,
administrative remedies-and not criminal sanctions-should be the appropriate result. See, e.g., Rachel E.
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L.
REv. 869 (2009) (arguing for separation of investigative and adjudicative functions).
95. See Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice, supra note 73.
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available to assist community efforts addressing problems that lead to, or result
from, criminal activity or perceived flaws in the criminal justice system.96
Overall, the most recent focus upon the prosecutor's role is upon the need to
examine systemic reform to uphold the minister of justice principle and, in
administering justice, to look beyond the advocacy role.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
A. RECALIBRATING THE CHARGING FUNCTION
Increased attention to the prosecution's multiple roles, as well as its responsi-
bility for the increase in incarceration, necessarily calls for suggestions for
change. A primary area of focus is charging process where changes are both
necessary and readily subject to implementation.
A prosecutor's charging decision lies at the core of the prosecution function. It
has been described as "the most dangerous power of the prosecutor." 97 The
prosecutor's decision whether to charge, whom to charge, and what to charge are
characterized both by a uniquely broad discretion and by a discretion that is
virtually unreviewable. 98 As long as a prosecutor's charging decision is based on
probable cause and seemingly appropriate factors-such as weight of the
evidence, prosecutorial crime priorities, and interests of the victim-the courts
will not exercise any control.99 Only if a decision is found to be based on
improper criteria-for example, in a case of selective prosecution 00 or vindictive
prosecutiono0 -will the courts step in, and, then, with a tremendous amount of
deference. 102
To be sure, in approaching the exercise of charging discretion, the prosecutor
must calibrate the balance between minister of justice and advocate, as must be
done at every stage of the process. But how that balance plays out in daily
practice depends on the stage of the process and what prosecutorial function is
being performed. Thus, for example, because the prosecutor's role as advocate is
96. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(e).
97. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4 (1940).
98. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.) ("Few subjects are less adopted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of
his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings...."); United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)) ("So long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely
in his discretion.").
99. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
100. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (noting that the decision to prosecute may not be based on "an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 374 (1886).
101. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
102. See id.
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designed to make sure the adversary adjudication process yields a reliable
result, 10 3 it may be more appropriate for the prosecutor to function in the
advocacy role in the courtroom, where adjudication takes place. 104 There can
be no question that the court's review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the
courtroom reflects this approach.1 0 5 But in exercising its charging discretion, the
prosecutor acts primarily as a minister and administrator of justice, not as an
advocate; the advocate role is not essential to the charging function. Indeed,
several reasons support the conclusion that legally and ethically, in the role of
gatekeeper, the prosecutor properly emphasizes the minister of justice role.
First, the tremendous power wielded by the prosecution as gatekeeper requires
a focus on fairness and justice.1 0 6 The role as representative of the sovereign is
most acutely in play at this stage.1 0 7 As others have noted,os at the charging
stage, the prosecutor's decisions really determine the outcome of a criminal case
and define what society considers to be criminal.1 09 The prosecutor's role as
gatekeeper also carries the power to worsen or mitigate the influence of racial,
social, and political inequality on criminal justice outcomes.110 And it is also the
103. See Zacharias, Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice, supra note 22, at 64.
104. See id. at 49 (noting that the advocacy role is principally for advocacy at trial).
105. See, e.g., BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § § 10, 11 (2d ed. 2016).
106. See Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice, supra note 73, at 625-29 (the prosecutor's "special
power implies special responsibilities"); David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial
Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473 (2016) (describing the unique and important role of the prosecution
in mediating between police and the courts) [hereinafter Sklansky, Nature and Function of Prosecutorial
Power].
107. See Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice, supra note 73, at 625-37.
108. See Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 11 (discussing social consequences of the
prosecutorial project). The effect of charging upon the individual is noted by Monroe Freedman and Abbe
Smith:
The defendant's reputation is immediately damaged, frequently irreparably, regardless of an ultimate
acquittal. Anguish and anxiety become a daily presence for the defendant and for the defendant's
family and friends. The emotional strains of the criminal process have been known to destroy
marriages and to cause alienation or emotional disturbance among the accused's children. Also, the
financial burden can be enormous. A criminal charge may well result in loss of employment because
of absenteeism due to pretrial detention, attendance at hearings and the trial, or simply because the
accused has been named as a criminal defendant. The trial itself, building up to the terrible anxiety
during jury deliberations, is a harrowing experience.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 10.04 (LexisNexis 4th ed. 2010).
109. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 314 (2001)
[hereinafter Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth].
110. See generally Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013) (acknowledging racial
disparities in sentencing); Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 7 ("[W]hether prosecutors
take ownership of the adjudicative process or are simply critical contributors to it, their work will have
distributional effects they can either consider or ignore."). New ABA Standard 3-1.6 states that prosecutors
should be proactive in detecting, investigating, and eliminating improper biases, like race, and should regularly
assess the potential for biased or unfairly disparate impacts of their policies. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.6.
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point at which the prosecutor's role as mediator between the police and the courts
is most significant."' Moreover, the prosecutor has a "virtual monopoly of the
fact finding process,"ll2 based on a superior access to the crime scene and
knowledge of the facts. 1 13 Third, the prosecutor has a duty to truth that arises
from the constitutional obligation to protect the innocent and to not use false
evidence or suppress material favorable evidence.1 14 Indeed, assuming it can ever
be proven, deliberately bringing charges simply for an adversarial advantage-
that is, overcharging-would most likely be found to violate due process.1 1 5
In fact, the Standards specifically delineate non-adversarial considerations of
justice in charging."' To be sure, some noted prosecutors argue that they must
have confidence in the truth of the evidence before bringing or maintaining
criminal charges.' 1 7 Even though the ethics rules do not set forth such a standard
and only require that the prosecutor "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause,"" a prosecutor is
admonished that charges may not be brought if the prosecutor believes the
defendant is innocent, regardless of the weight of the evidence.1 1 9 As to when a
charge may not be filed, Standard 3-4.4(d) implicitly addresses the non-
adversarial nature of the charging function in stating that "the prosecutor should
not file or maintain charges greater in number or degree than can reasonably be
supported with evidence at trial and are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of
the offense or deter similar conduct."1 2 0 The final subsection (f) advises that the
prosecutor "should consider the possibility of a noncriminal disposition, formal
or informal, or a deferred prosecution or other diversionary disposition" in
111. See Sklansky, Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, supra note 106.
112. See Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, supra note 109, at 314.
113. See id. at 314-15. Of course, this may not be the case in many systems where the prosecution has only
the information supplied by a police report prior to charging. This is especially the case in high volume
misdemeanor practices.
114. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935) (per curiam) (knowing use of perjured testimony
by a prosecutor violates due process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (failure to disclose material
exculpatory evidence violates due process).
115. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-64 (1978).
116. See generally 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.4.
117. See Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., The Conscience and Culture of a Prosecutor, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 629, 635
(2013) (noting that the office did not choose to prosecute Dominque Strauss-Kahn because it did not believe that
he was guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt") [hereinafter Vance, Conscience and Culture of a Prosecutor]. See
generally MODEL RULES R. 3.8(a) (prosecutor must not bring a charge that is "not supported by probable
cause"); 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.3(a) ("A prosecutor should seek or file criminal
charges only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that
admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to
charge is in the interests of justice.").
118. MODEL RULES R. 3.8(a); see 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.3(a).
119. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.3(d).
120. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.4(d).
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deciding whether to initiate or continue charges. 12 1 Standard 3-4.3 states that
once charges are brought they should only be maintained if the prosecutor
continues to have the same reasonable belief and admonishes the prosecutor to
bring "significant doubt[s] about the guilt of the accused or the quality,
truthfulness, or sufficiency of the evidence" to a supervisor. 12 2 These are explicit
non-adversarial requirements.
Aside from requiring a subjective belief in guilt, the Standards require the
prosecutor to conclude that the decision to charge is made in the interests of
justice. Standard 3-4.4(a) provides that a prosecutor should seek or file criminal
charges only if "the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported
by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be sufficient to support the
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in the
interests of justice."1 2 3 The question of what constitutes the "interests of justice"
here is addressed in Standard 3-4.4, which makes clear that the prosecutor "is not
obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges" that might in fact be supported by
the evidence. In fact, under Standard 3-1.2(e) the prosecutor must be "knowledge-
able about, consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing
alternatives to prosecution or conviction that may be applicable in individual
cases or classes of cases."1 2 4 The Standards then list the factors that a prosecutor
may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss a
criminal charge, even though it meets [the minimal charging requirements]:
(i) the strength of the case;
(ii) the prosecutor's doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(iii) the extent or absence of harm caused by the offense;
(iv) the impact of prosecution or non-prosecution on the public welfare;
(v) the background and characteristics of the offender, including any
voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation;
(vi) whether the authorized or likely punishment or collateral consequences
are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or the offender;
(vii) the views and motives of the victim or complainant;
(viii) any improper conduct by law enforcement;
(ix) unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons;
121. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.4(f). Interestingly, the non-adversarial role of the
prosecutor pretrial, is also reflected in Model Rule 3.8, "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor." See MODEL
RULES R. 3.8. Among other things, that rule explicitly requires prosecutors to take reasonable measures to assure
that the accused knows of the right to obtain counsel and has an opportunity to do so. It also requires that a
prosecutor not seek a waiver from the accused of important pretrial rights. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8(b), (c).
122. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.3.
123. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.3.
124. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(e).
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(x) potential collateral impact on third parties, including witnesses or victims;
(xi) cooperation of the offender in the apprehension or conviction of others;
(xii) the possible influence of any cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic or other
improper biases;
(xiii) changes in law or policy;
(xiv) the fair and efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial resources;
(xv) the likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction; and
(xvi) whether the public's interests in the matter might be appropriately
vindicated by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private
remedies. 1 2 5
At least seven of these sixteen enumerated criteria reflect non-adversarial
considerations involving the harm caused by the mass incarceration state and that
must be balanced in determining the public's interest in non-prosecution or
diversion for minor crimes.
In fact, the revised Standards on the whole reflect a fulsome view of the
prosecutor's minister of justice role that is consistent with the prosecutor's
uniquely broad power to impact the criminal justice process. Like the listed
criteria, the Standards as a whole reflect a responsibility to consider a wider
notion of "public interest" beyond crime prevention, in the requirement that a
prosecutor's office should be available to assist "community efforts addressing
problems that lead to, or result from, criminal activity or perceived flaws in the
criminal justice system." 1 2 6 Mass incarceration certainly is a "problem . .. that
result[s] from perceived flaws in the criminal justice system." 1 2 7 Prosecutors
must also be active in eliminating policies and procedures that have a racial or
other disparate impact on the communities they serve. 1 2 8 New Standard 3-1.6
prescribes that a prosecutor's office should be
proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and eliminate improper biases, with
particular attention to historically persistent biases like race, in all of its work.
A prosecutor's office should regularly assess the potential for biased or unfairly
125. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.4. "The prosecutor should not enter into a
disposition agreement before having information sufficient to assess the defendant's actual culpability. The
prosecutor should consider collateral consequences of a conviction before entering into a disposition agreement.
The prosecutor should consider factors listed in Standard 3-4.4(a)." 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
Standard 3-5.6. Standard 3-5.9 states that when criminal charges are dismissed, the prosecutor should make and
retain an appropriate record of the reasons for the dismissal and note whether the dismissal was with or without
prejudice. See 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-5.9. Another source for the substantive content
of the "interests of justice" can be found in section 210.40 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, which
delineates the grounds for dismissal in the interests of justice. See N.Y CRi. PROc. LAw § 210.40 (McKinney 2016).
126. See 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(e).
127. See 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(e).
128. See 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.6.
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disparate impacts of its policies on communities within the prosecutor's
jurisdiction, and eliminate those impacts that cannot be properly justified. 1 2 9
Finally, the Standards make clear that the prosecutor is not simply part of law
enforcement or only the next stage of the process after the police. Standard
3-1.2(f) makes clear that the prosecutor is not merely a case-processor but also a
"problem-solver" who is "responsible for considering broad goals of the criminal
justice system." 130
The prosecutor should seek to reform and improve the administration of
criminal justice, and when inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or
procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, the prosecutor should
stimulate and support efforts for remedial action. The prosecutor should
provide service to the community, including involvement in public service and
bar activities, public education, community service activities, and Bar leader-
ship positions. A prosecutorial office should support such activities, and the
office's budget should include funding and paid release time for such
activities. 131
Thus, while the police may be engaged in the "often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime,"1 3 2 the prosecutor's charging role is different.
If, as seems true, aggressive prosecutorial charging practices have, in great
measure, caused the problem of mass incarceration, the culture of charging needs
to change to both follow these ABA prescriptions more closely and to accurately
reflect the real and very varied dimensions of the role of the prosecutor. First, it
should be acknowledged that charging decisions have had a role in creating the
current devastating social problem of mass incarceration, with its disproportion-
ate racial impact, and that the prosecutor has a unique power to fix it. Then, as a
minister and administer of justice, the prosecutor should establish systems and
changes in practice-written ones, according to the Standards-to take these
consequences into account. Such changes would include a broader view of the
"public" (whose interest the prosecutor protects, including those whose liberty
and lives are damaged) and of that public's "interests" that would include larger
social justice issues-preventing the racially imbalanced, criminogenic effects of
charging minor crimes-assuring that the choice of a felony charge is reflected in
the factors listed in the revised standards. As set forth, infra, it would also include
fulfilling the prosecution's unique position between the police and the courts, as
mediator between these two institutions. Practices should (1) assure that the
prosecutor's charging decision is independent and made on the basis of valid
129. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.6.
130. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(f).
131. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.2(f). Section (f) is addressed, in great measure, to
systemic reforms, but it is also applicable to individual cases.
132. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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prosecutor criteria, not on non-reflective or hurried acquiescence to police
strategy; (2) be based on accurate data; and (3) require accountability from the
police. 13 3 Cultural and institutional deterrents currently prevent prosecutors from
engaging in these practices, even though most prosecutors probably want to
implement them now. To a great extent, respect for and legitimacy of our criminal
justice system depends upon these changes in prosecutorial culture. 1 34
One practice that has gained traction in limited jurisdictions in the United
States is to divert certain cases out of the criminal justice system or to decline to
prosecute. 13 5 This is hardly a universal practice. 1 36 Unfortunately, the response of
many jurisdictions in the United States seems to have been the worst of both
worlds: keeping minor crimes within the criminal justice process, handling them
in what can only be described as an administrative system, but imposing criminal
sanctions. 13 7 This "plea mill" nature of misdemeanor practice and its dire social
and racial consequences continues to undermine respect for the criminal justice
system. As gatekeepers, prosecutors should focus more attention on declination
to prosecute in the first instance, and diversion for certain cases that are
prosecuted. 138
The same renewed interest in adapting to similar criminal justice challenges is
not limited to the United States. High workloads have created documented
challenges in Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the
133. For a discussion of the role of the prosecutor vis-a-vis the police, see supra Part I.C.
134. In the last decade, there has been increasing focus upon prosecutorial accountability, including
prosecutor's responsibility for wrongful convictions and improper exercise of discretion. Judge Alex Kozinski
famously said that there is an "epidemic" of prosecutorial misconduct and that only judges could put a stop to it.
Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 51, 53
(2016).
135. See, e.g., Kevin Flannery, City Prosecutor Launches Felony Diversion Program, Federal Grant Will
Fund Innovative Response to Select First-Time Gun Charges, ST. Louis DISPATCH (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.
stlamerican.com/news/localnews/article e9bd3c84-6870-11e5-a227-OfcObca44eea.html?mode=jqm [https://
perma.cc/P2V2-38E7]; Jessica McDonald, Three Years In: A Look at Philadelphia's Drug Diversion Program,
NEWSWORKS.ORG (July 7, 2015), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/philadelphia/83824-three-
years-in-a-look-at-philadelphias-drug-felony-diversion-program [https://perma.cc/KW9H-KYE2].
136. See, e.g., Megan N. Krebbeks, One Step at a Time: Reforming Drug Diversion Programs in California,
13 CHAP. L. REV. 417 (2010); State Attorney's Office, 18th Judicial Circuit, Misdemeanor Pretrial Diversion
Program, http://sal8.org/page/misdemeanor-diversion.html [https://perma.cc/5W6D-B9EH] (last visited Mar.
14, 2017).
137. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK, & MAUREEN DIMINo, NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS
(Apr. 2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ [https://perma.cc/J4NG-CEM5].
138. In 2014, the late Ken Thompson, District Attorney in Brooklyn, NY, announced that he would no longer
prosecute minor marijuana possession cases. Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prosecutor
Limits When He'll Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/
brooklyn-district-attorney-to-stop-prosecuting-low-level-marijuana-cases.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/S429-
EEF9]. See Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 1, at 288 (prosecutors should decline to prosecute
whole "classes of minor offenses" where policing choices are marked by "racial disparities or overburden the
system and compromise procedural justice"); CHAUHAN ET AL., ENFORCEMENT RATES IN NEW YORK CITY, supra
note 27.
2017] 321
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
Netherlands, as well as other countries. 1 39 And the extent to which this has
increased the focus on and power of prosecutors has been extensively discussed
and analyzed. 14 0 Indeed, a recent study entitled Coping with Overloaded
Criminal Justice Systems analyzes and compares the overloaded criminal justice
systems in those six countries and the prosecutors' role in those systems. 141 The
study analyzes how the criminal justice system and the role of the prosecution
have been challenged by explosive growth in the work of their criminal courts.
Clearly, as fewer cases can be adjudicated in the courts, the role of prosecutors
has grown. 14 2 At the same time, among the comparative institutional responses to
major increases in workload have been to (1) decriminalize certain behaviors and
have them dealt with administratively, using administrative offenses and fines (to
decrease the number of cases handled in the criminal justice system); (2) increase
reliance on the police to make the charging decisions; (3) divert more cases out of
the criminal justice system; and (4) expand the use of shortcuts in the process,
such as plea bargaining. 143
Overall, the authors of the study recommend that the best way to deal with
systemic overload is by decriminalizing minor crimes, that is, to handle minor
crimes administratively, outside the criminal justice process, rather than as
crimes.'1 This process would, of course, permit only civil penalties, like fines. 145
The study suggests that to the extent that minor offenses remain in the criminal
justice system because they are not decriminalized, greater discretion should
exist for dismissals by prosecutors. 14 6 And for charges that are neither decriminal-
ized nor dismissed, dispositions by prosecutors should bring administrative (e.g.,
fines) and not criminal penalties.1 4 7 In such a system, the exercise of authority
should be governed by clear rules or statutes and should be subject to
examination by the court. 14" Thus, the least effective solution seems to be to cede
charging decisions to the police or to insist on imposing criminal penalties for
139. Global Strategy on Occupational Health for All: The Way to Health at Work, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.intoccupational-health/globstrategy/en/index4.html [https://perma.cc/6JJQ-PRL2] (last vis-
ited Jan. 17, 2017).
140. For domestic examples, see Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutor Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 261 (2011).
141. JORG-MARTIN JEHLE & MARIANNE WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE
RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER ACROSS EUROPE (2005) [hereinafter JEHLE & WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS].
142. See Sklansky, Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, supra note 106, at 17 and authorities cited
therein.
143. JEHLE & WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, supra note 141, at 19-24.
144. Id. at 24-25.
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 24-25.
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minor, victimless conduct. 149 That, of course, is the current process in the United
States.
B. ENSURING INDEPENDENCE FROM AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF
THE POLICE
One aspect of the prosecution function that has received little attention is the
prosecutor's role in relation to the police. In the federal system, there has been
some attention to the interaction of U.S. prosecutors and law enforcement,
specifically with respect to the relationship of federal prosecutors with the FBI150
or with their informers.1 5 1 Yet little attention has been paid to examining, much
less regulating, the important relationship between state district attorneys and the
police. 152
As has been recognized, in a liberal democracy prosecutors play a unique and
important mediating role between the police and the courts and between the
legislature and the courts. 153 As gatekeepers with extensive discretion, they have
the power to "modulate" the impact of criminal legislation on criminal justice
outcomes; with their proximity to the courts, they have a special capacity to
"reduce the punitive effects of police enforcement practices." 1 5 4 Yet as noted
above, whether inadvertently, through haste, or purposely, prosecutors have
abdicated this responsibility by deferring to the charging decisions of the
police.1 5 5 This has likely contributed both to the mass incarceration problem and
to a sense of doubt about the legitimacy of the process.
One way to change the charging function in the face of mass incarceration
would be to shed light on and formally shape the currently unstructured
relationship of prosecutors and police; another way would be to more clearly
define the prosecutor's role in that relationship. Indeed, a part of the current
149. Id. at 19.
150. See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
749 (2003).
151. See id.; Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L.
REv. 645 (2004); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917 (1999).
152. One area that has received some attention is the prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable information
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1970). In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Supreme Court held
that the police failure to disclose would be imputed to the prosecution; that is, the prosecutor had an obligation
to conduct a reasonable inquiry and search of police files to discover information that should be disclosed to the
defense. In so holding, the Court assumed the prosecution has mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring police
disclosure. Of course, that assumption is not universally true. Indeed, in an attempt to remedy the difficulty in
holding police accountable for disclosure, prosecutors have begun to use checklists to ensure greater police
compliance. See Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Production Protocols, 45 TEX.
TECH. L. REv. 133, 146-47 (2012).
153. RICHMAN, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 6-7.
154. Id. at 7 (observing that "a lot of what prosecutors do is interstitial, dampening the zeal of some (units or
individuals) and spurring others on").
155. See supra Part I.C.
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interest in greater accountability of prosecutors includes a focus on the
police-prosecution relationship. 156 This new interest is not surprising, given two
recent phenomena: (1) the failure of prosecutors to indict police officers in the
killing of unarmed black men in Ferguson, Missouri; Staten Island, New York;
Tulsa, Oklahoma; San Diego, California; and other cities;1 5 7 and (2) the
recognition that broken-windows policing has had a significant negative impact
on minority and poor communities and, ultimately, has led to mass incarceration.1 58
Again, the ABA Standards reflect the unique and powerful role of the
prosecutor vis-h-vis the police, but they provide little structure. They certainly
make clear that the prosecutor must both (1) act independently of the police; and
(2) supervise the police. So, for example, Standard 3-4.2 specifically states that
"while the decision to arrest is often the responsibility of law enforcement
personnel, the decision to institute formal criminal proceedings is the responsibil-
ity of the prosecutor."1 5 9 Standard 3-3.2, "Relationships with Law Enforcement,"
advises prosecutors, inter alia, to "maintain respectful yet independent judgment
when interacting with law enforcement personnel," to "become familiar with and
respect the experience and specialized expertise of law enforcement personnel,"
and to "provide independent legal advice to law enforcement." 1 6 0 New Standard
3-1.3 contains the blunt reminder that the prosecutor "does not represent law
enforcement personnel who have worked on the matter" and those law
enforcement personnel are not the prosecutor's clients.1 6 1
A supervisory, independent role is further prescribed by the Standards, which
state that "in determining whether formal criminal charges should be filed,
prosecutors should consider whether further investigation should be under-
taken," 1 6 2 and, after charges are filed "should oversee law enforcement investiga-
tive activity related to the case."163 The Standards also counsel prosecutors to
156. RICHMAN, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 12.
157. See Chico Harlan, Wesley Lowery & Kimberly Kindy, Ferguson Police Officer Won't Be Charged In
Fatal Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/grand-jury-reaches-
decision-in-case-of-ferguson-officer/2014/11/24/de48e7e4-7 1d7- 11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html?utm
term=.0c1409b82149 [https://perma.cc/CJL5-9HUM]; Andrew Siff, Jonathan Dienst, & Jennifer Millman,
Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Death, NBC N.Y (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Grand-Jury-Decision-Eric-Garner-Staten-Island-Chokehold-Death-
NYPD-284595921.html [https://perma.cc/LY99-GYC9]; Alex Kueny, San Diego's Elite Should Be Held
Accountable, SOCIALIST WORKER (Jan. 21, 2016), https://socialistworker.org/2016/01/21/holding-san-diegos-
elite-accountable [https://perma.ccl334C-ZFA6].
158. See supra Part I. As discussed above, this connection is explored by K. Babe Howell in her seminal
article, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing,
supra note 30.
159. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.2(a).
160. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-3.2(b).
161. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-1.3. This blunt admonition would appear unnecessary,
were the reminder apparently not deemed so important.
162. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.2(c).
163. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-4.2(c).
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"keep law enforcement personnel informed of relevant legal and legal ethics
issues and developments as they relate to prosecution matters, and advise law
enforcement personnel of relevant prosecution policies and procedures."1 6 4
Under the Standards, prosecutors "should meet and confer regularly with law
enforcement agencies regarding prosecution as well as law enforcement policies"
and should assist in developing and administering training programs for law
enforcement personnel on matters and cases being investigated, "matters
submitted for charging, and the law related to law enforcement activities."1 6 5 If
prosecutors are overwhelmed and forced to behave unethically because they rely
too heavily on police charging policies, or are unable to effectively screen the
basis for charging, the practice needs to change.
Again, lessons can be drawn from a comparative perspective. One need only
look to the United Kingdom to realize that one way to ensure independence and
supervision would be to increase the formality of the police-prosecutor relation-
ship by (1) creating a more hierarchical police structure; and/or (2) requiring
written guidelines and greater documentation. In England and Wales, levels of
internal police authority often require that the investigating or arresting officer
report in writing to and be supervised by a senior police officer. 166 This occurs,
for example, with respect to discovery, where every case requires the appoint-
ment of a discovery officer to supervise the discovery process.1 6 7 To be sure, this
structure is based in the history and culture of UK policing, and would require
cultural changes to be made by state police departments. But creating written
guidelines and greater documentation requirements by the police could be done
more easily, possibly by prosecutors' offices themselves, and would improve the
charging function while increasing its efficiency. So, for example, as in England,
the police could be required to fill out checklists that document precisely what
was done and what evidence supports an arrest, provide information about
relevant locations, witnesses, and other suspects, and provide more detailed
information about arrestees.1 6 8
164. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-3.2(c).
165. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-3.2(d).
166. JEHLE & WADE, COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, supra note 141, at 41-44.
167. See generally Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, pt. I, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga
1996/25/contents [https://perma.cc/8NGK-VLFG]; Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act Code of Practice
1996, s. 23, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/447967/code-of-
practice-approved.pdf [https://perma.cc/J28L-82L7] (prescribing different roles for Investigator (reporting
officer); Officer in charge of an investigation; Disclosure officer; and Prosecutor); id. (disclosure officers or
their deputies must inspect, view or listen to all relevant material that has been retained and the lead disclosure
officer must provide a personal declaration to the effect that this task has been undertaken).
168. See the schedule for "Unused Evidence," available from the authors, which is used in England and
Wales to record and transmit exculpatory evidence from the police to the prosecutor.
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Informal interviews with prosecutors reveal that they both welcome increased
formality and fear it. 16 9 To the extent, for example, that written reports and
checklists filled out by the police give the prosecutor more complete information
about what has been done and thus greater police accountability, a prosecutor's
relationship with the individual police officers with whom she works is likely to
be affected by the formality of documentation. On the other hand, when it is
difficult, but necessary, to challenge the police, the existence of such forms and
checklists would take the onus and blame off of the prosecutor by showing the
prosecutor's concerns are systemic, across-the-board requirements.
It is probably fair to say that, in the United States, the relationship between
prosecutors and police remains a hidden "black box,"1 7 0 where the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is insulated. The police-prosecutor relationship is as
multi-dimensional and fundamental as it is informal, difficult, and unscrutinized.
To be sure, it carries incentives for prosecutors to accept the police investigation
and rubberstamp the charges both because prosecutors work with and rely on
police in the long term and because prosecutors at this stage are overwhelmed by
volume. A complicated set of other factors may affect the prosecutor's ready
acceptance of the results of the police investigation. These include the personality
of the individual prosecutor, her age and experience, the extent of supervision,
office culture, and political pressures upon the chief elected prosecutor.1 7 1
But there seems to be an increasing recognition-both legal and ethical-that
the two institutions do not always share the same goals or values and that the
prosecutor has the power to perform an important and independent mediating
role. Internal structures and procedures should be created that reflect these
realities.
C. DEVELOPING MEANINGFUL, EVIDENCE-BASED INTERNAL
REGULATION
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL REGULATION
In a variety of contexts, it has been argued that the best way to achieve change
in the criminal justice process is to change internal office culture, rather than
169. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What
Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 1943, 1953-54 (2010) (introducing a Brady symposium on ensuring
compliance with disclosure obligations).
170. See generally Marc L. Miller & Ronald F Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REv. 125 (2008).
171. See Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Risk, Maturation, and Wrongful Conviction
Practice, LAW & Soc. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705553 [https://perma.cc/H7X5-
NAVC] (discussing the effect of personality, experience, moral code, and organizational experiences upon
prosecutorial discretionary decision-making; concerning the impact of inexperience, the authors note that "the
newly hired prosecutor believes her role is simply to fit each case into the relevant statutory mold"). See
generally Medwed, Prosecutor as Minister of Justice, supra note 80; Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce Green,
Prosecutors'Ethics in Context, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269 (Leslie C.
Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) [hereinafter Yaroshefsky & Green, Prosecutors'Ethics in Context].
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imposing external legal requirements. 17 2 A significant step toward achieving such
a goal would be the development of internal prosecutorial office guidelines and
practices. 17 3 The U.S. Department of Justice Attorneys' Manual and its Guide-
lines are an example of such documents, 1 74 and some district attorney's offices
have created similar ones.1 7 5 Unfortunately, these office guidelines and practices
are rare and exist in only some jurisdictions.
The ABA Standards call on prosecutors to establish internal guidelines and
office policies to guide the substantial prosecutorial discretion their offices
possess,1 7 6 as well as to structure a better partnership with the police.1 7 7 Standard
3-2.4 is clear on this requirement. Subsection (a) states explicitly that every
prosecutor's office "should seek to develop general policies to guide the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, and standard operating procedures for the office." 1 7 8
These policies and procedures should be memorialized and available internally,
and should be disclosed publicly where appropriate. 17 9
Professor Michael Cassidy has amplified this duty with respect to charging. He
proposes that prosecutors have an ethical duty to adopt office structures and
policies that ensure that the substantial prosecutorial discretion in charge
bargaining with respect to mandatory minimum sentences be conducted in the
172. The importance of system-wide attention to cultural change has been explored in the context of securing
compliance with prosecutorial disclosure obligations. See, e.g., Yaroshefsky & Green, Prosecutors' Ethics in
Context, supra note 171, at 289, 290; Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations, and
the Prosecutorial Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 5 (2013); Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial
Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1133, 1154 (2005); Kathleen
M. Ridolfi, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on
Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 1961, 2031 (2010) (noting external as well as internal controls to change
culture).
173. See Ridolfi, supra note 172, at 2031.
174. In addition, former Attorney General Eric Holder famously issued internal memoranda, at least one
specifically on charging. See Memorandum from the Office of the United States Attorneys and the Assistant
Attorney General of the Criminal Division (Aug. 12,2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/
2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-
in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZG4-3SDF].
175. There are some counties in various states that have developed guidelines for specific practices and for
handling certain types of cases, such as domestic violence and sexual assault cases. Unlike the federal
government's U.S. Attorneys' Manual, these are often unpublished. The District Attorneys Association of New
York has also published a guide for ethical decision-making. DISTRICT AITORNEYS Ass'N OF THE STATE OF N.Y.,
THE RIGHT THING: ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTORS (2015), http://www.daasny.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/2015-Ethics-Handbook.pdf. [https://perma.cc/29GC-BPLW]. The National District Attorneys Associa-
tion has also published an aspirational guide. NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS (3d. ed. 2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%2OEd.%20w%2ORevised%20
Commentary.pdf [https://perma.cc/25EW-RZ8X].
176. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-2.4(a).
177. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-2.7.
178. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-2.4(a).
179. 2015 ABA PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 3-2.4(b).
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public interest, i.e., fairly, consistently, and transparently. 8 0 Cassidy argues that
such a regime requires written guidelines setting forth the factors prosecutors
must consider before recommending reduction of any felony charge carrying a
mandatory minimum sentence. 8 He also advocates establishing small commit-
tees to consider and approve written requests by prosecutors for reduction of such
charges, 18 2 which would contain a checklist of the factors and a place for a
narrative description of the reasons supporting the request. 18 3 Defense attorneys
would also be allowed to petition the committee in writing for a charge reduction,
if the individual prosecutor has opposed it. 18 4 Cassidy proposes that these
committees should include a retired judge, lay citizen, or member of the staff with
previous defense experience.18 5 Professor Cassidy suggests that such procedures
will enable prosecutors to collect the data they need to guide their policies and
practices. 1 6 He also suggests that the need to obtain permission to dismiss will
likely force prosecutors to be more realistic and proportional in their initial
charging decisions. 187
In addition to the U.S. Department of Justice, some other U.S. jurisdictions
have begun experimenting with written prosecutorial guidelines for charging. For
example, Florida and New Jersey recently adopted guidelines with respect to
charging repeat offenders. In Florida, the Prosecuting Attorneys Association
(PAA) adopted written guidelines that set forth criteria for determining whether
to charge someone as a habitual offender. 88 Indictments that do not meet the
criteria must be accompanied by a written explanation signed by the designated
180. Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice, supra note 65, at 984, 996-97. Scholars have begun to analyze
internal regulation as a source of meaningful control of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Daniel Medwed,
Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 51 VLL. L. REV. 337
(2006); Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines, supra note 28.
181. Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice, supra note 65, at 1016-17.
182. Id. at 1013. Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance created a similar practice where a committee
decides upon prosecuting certain cases. See Vance, Conscience and Culture of a Prosecutor, supra note 117.
183. Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice, supra note 65, at 1017.
184. Id. at 1013. Professor Cassidy notes that his recommendation is based on the procedures presently used
when federal prosecutors want to offer substantial assistance departures (5K1.1 letters) in federal court. See id.
at 1014-15. It also somewhat resembles the Correction Integrity Units currently being used by prosecutors to
examine claims of innocence. See id. at 1017.
185. Id. at 1016 (stating that most prosecutors would object to inclusion of persons outside their employ
exercising discretion in the prosecutorial function).
186. See infra Part III.C.2.
187. Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice, supra note 65, at 1013-14; see also Rory K. Little, Proportionality as
an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723 (1999). Proposing
proportionality in prosecutorial investigation by consideration of a range of factors including
not just monetary costs, but also significant intangible costs such as privacy intrusions, emotional
stress, and stigma. They should balance such costs against factors such as the gravity of the offense,
the likely benefit from the proposed investigative step, and whether any less costly (including less
intrusive) steps might suffice.
Id. at 727.
188. Cassidy, (Ad)Ministering Justice, supra note 65, at 1021.
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assistant prosecutor as well as the elected state's attorney for why deviating from
the guidelines was appropriate. These statements must be filed with the court and
the PAA.189
In New Jersey, the Supreme Court has mandated charging and plea-bargaining
standards in cases involving mandatory drug sentences. These guidelines, the
"Brimage Guidelines," govern when a prosecutor may waive or reduce an
otherwise mandatory prison term.1 90 Similar to the process in Florida, the
guidelines require filling out a worksheet setting forth the reasons for and size of
the deviation, aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors, and any other
sentencing considerations.1 91
Another model for internal prosecutor guidelines is reflected in the recent
report on District Attorney Conviction Review Units (CRUs). 192 This report
examined the twenty-seven existing CRUs 193 with a view to making recommen-
dations for best practices in these units. It concluded that such units should be
"independent, flexible, and transparent in [their] work." To achieve these goals,
the report sets forth a twenty-three-item list of standards to be met and procedures
to be followed. 194 A similar list could be created for other prosecutorial functions,
including charging decisions and interactions with the police. In addition, the best
practices procedures include a requirement that the CRUs develop additional
clear policies and procedures for various stakeholders, including applicants
claiming to be innocent.1 95
It is worth pointing out that the U.S. system is unique among common law
countries in its absence of meaningful written guidelines for prosecutors. Indeed,
the United States may look to the United Kingdom as another model for
meaningful written guidelines for prosecutors. In the United Kingdom, codes of
practice, like the Code of Practice for Crown Prosecutors, 1 96 accompany
legislation on criminal justice issues and share the authority of parliamentary
189. Id. at 1021-22.
190. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN ST. L.
REv. 1087, 1098-1100 (2005).
191. These kinds of worksheets and checklists would greatly facilitate the kind of data collection necessary
for policy-making and accountability. See infra Part III.C.2.
192. See John Holloway, Conviction Review Units: A National Perspective, in PENN LAW LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (Apr. 2016), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2615
&context=facultyscholarship [https://perma.cc/5MEW-3LTR]. A CRU is defined as a unit that "conducts
extrajudicial, fact-based review of secured convictions to investigate possible allegations of actual innocence. A
CRU is typically contained within a local prosecutor's office." Id. at 2. The report discusses the North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission, which is a state-created unit to examine wrongful convictions.
193. See id. at 8.
194. Id. at 2-4.
195. See generally id.
196. The Code for Crown Prosecutors, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/
codeforscrownprosecutors/ [https://perma.cc/47CZ-43V3] (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
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enactments. 1 97 In addition to the Code, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the
UK's institutional prosecutor, publishes "The Director's Guidance on Charging,"
which is periodically updated.198 The CPS also issues a wide variety of specific
guidance documents on handling various challenges presented by specific kinds
of prosecutions (e.g., domestic violence,1 99 forensic evidence, 2 0 0 and unex-
plained infant deaths 20 1).
With the growing recognition that our criminal justice system operates as an
administrative model and not an adjudicative one, and one that is dominated by
prosecutors, comes an increased need to formalize procedures by which
prosecutors essentially function as fact-finders to determine who is guilty and of
what offenses. Failure to have written guidelines permits the kind of ad hoc
decision-making that can be discriminatory and inconsistent, and can result in
systemic unfairness with significant social consequences. This is exactly how one
would describe the emergence of the mass incarceration state.
2. THE NEED FOR DATA
The twin pillars of transparency and accountability guide institutions and
administrative offices in a liberal democracy like the United States. Transparency
is acknowledged as a key democratic norm,20 2 and systems that assure
documentation of practices, procedures, and data have long been established
197. Section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act requires that the director issue a code for crown
prosecutors that provides guidance to crown prosecutors on charging, discontinuing proceedings, and mode of
trial. Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, c. 23, § 10 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/23/section/
10 [https://perma.cclZRP9-LS3Z] (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
198. The Director's Guidance on Charging 2013 (Revised Arrangements), CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (5th
ed., May 2013), https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors-guidance/dpp-guidance_5.html [https://perma.
cc/E9CP-MLXH].
199. Domestic Abuse Guidelines for Prosecutors, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/legall
d_to_g/domestic abuse.guidelines-for.prosecutors/ [https://perma-cc/NV85-PG6V] (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
200. Low Copy Number DNA Testing, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/Publications/
Prosecution/lowcopystesting.html [https://perma.ccl7P2S-9RMX] (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
201. Non Accidental Head Injury Cases (NAHL Formerly Referred to as Shaken Baby Syndrome
[SBSJ)-Prosecution Approach, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/1_too/non accidental
headinjury-cases/ [https://perma.cc/SHE3-7CF4] (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). Other examples of checklists
used by UK prosecutors can be found at Autism: Checklist for Prosecutors, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV.,
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/autism - checklist-for-prosecutors-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G7SF-7UH4] (last visited Apr. 10, 2017); Low Copy Number DNA Analysis (LCN)-Prosecutors' Checklist of
Questions, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/cnchecklist.html
[https://perma.cc/F8B4-ME5X] (last visited Feb. 10, 2017); The Director's Guidance On Charging 2013
(Revised Arrangements), CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. (5th ed. May 2013), https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/
directorsguidance/dpp.guidance_5.html [https://perma.cc/4MPM-SU7U].
202. See Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability: Conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic Mappings, in
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABLITY: DESIGN, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 1, 3 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). On the
prevalence of transparency discourse, see Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1339, 1340-42. For general benefits of transparency in government, see Mark Fenster, The Opacity of
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REv. 885, 895-902 (2006); see RICHMAN, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20,
at 28.
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within government and business. 203 An operating principle for public officials
and civil servants, as well as directors and managers of companies and
organizations and board trustees, is a duty to "act visibly, predictably and
understandably to promote participation and accountability." 2 0 4 It is often said
that without transparency, there can be little accountability.2 0 5 Yet, within the
U.S. criminal justice system the broad discretion afforded to prosecutors is not
accompanied by requirements that practices and procedures be documented or
that the exercise of discretion be explained.2 06 Although transparency is a robust
concept within government agencies, we do not demand transparency of our
prosecutors.2 07 Other countries regularly require annual reports from prosecuting
agencies.20 8 While data collection may be unwieldy in some instances, transpar-
ency for data in charging decisions should be adopted.209
Again, it is fair to say that we are unique in how little data we collect or keep
regarding prosecutorial practices and their consequences.2 10 Shawn Marie Boyne
has shown that a "significant part of a German prosecutor's initial training
203. See generally Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the
United States, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 79 (2012).
204. Definitions, TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY INITIATIVE, http://www.transparency-initiative.org/about/
definitions [https://perma.cc/T5EK-FRRK] (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
205. See Mark Bovens, Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 182, 182
(Ewan Ferlie, Laurence E. Lynn Jr. & Christopher Pollitt eds., 2007); see also Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving
and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2009) ("Modern public law is strongly devoted to the notion
that public officials should be held 'accountable' for their decisions.").
206. Prosecutors are protected by "evidentiary rules that preclude the presentation of a great deal of
information considered in the decision to charge, as well as legislation lacking much specificity, and a doctrinal
framework that frees prosecutors from ever explaining why charges were not brought." RICHMAN, Accounting
for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 25.
207. See generally Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in
the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443 (2012) (examining transparency campaigns to prevent
government secrecy concluding that it requires organizing from the outside and that its definition and limits are
contested).
208. See, e.g., CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., ANNUAL REPORTAND ACCOUNTS 2015-16, https://www.cps.gov.uk/
publications/docs/annual-report_2015_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M3Z-RBJC] [hereinafter CROWN ANNUAL
REPORT].
209. See Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies,
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155, 1174-75 (2005) (suggesting administrative model of transparency for charging
decisions and citing Gerard E. Lynch, OurAdministrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117
(1998) (describing system as prosecutor-centered administrative law system; rejecting whole-sale administra-
tive law model because pretense of legislative primacy serves useful functions and because cost of APA type
procedures would be excessive; but commending a right to be heard regarding prosecutorial charging
decisions)); cf. Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515 (2000) (arguing
for administrative-law rulemaking approach to regulate discretionary enforcement by police of overbroad penal
codes).
210. Ironically, of course, we are also unique in the extent to which we permit a defendant's record to be
public, punitive, and permanent. See, e.g., RICHMAN, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 31 ("The
European Union and its member states treat individual criminal history information as personal data that the
individual has a right not to have disclosed by government personnel or by private parties." (internal citation
omitted)).
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involves one-on-one training in the art of documenting actions taken on a case
file." 2 11 England and Wales maintain extensive records on prosecutorial process-
ing of cases that are published in annual, publicly available reports 2 12 and data
complications,2 13 or are otherwise available to the public. 14 In the late 1990s,
federal and state organizations strengthened data collection systems to study
aspects of the criminal system. Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS) periodically sponsored studies to "collect data on the
resources, policies, and practices of local chief prosecutors in state court
systems."2 15 From 1990 to 1996, the NSP collected data from a nationally
representative sample of chief prosecutors that tried felony cases in state courts of
general jurisdictions. 2 16 Then, in 2003, to provide empirically-based information
to establish performance measures, the National District Attorneys Association
(NDAA) gathered information to produce "Prosecution for the 21st Century," a
performance measurement framework.21 7 This data, however, does not address
charging decision-making. Since then, numerous studies have examined aspects
of prosecutorial practice.
Some jurisdictions have moved toward greater data collection. For example,
South Dakota, to assess the impact of the state's sentencing reforms on its mass
incarceration problem, required extensive collection of data about charging,
sentencing, and parole revocation, but did not collect data about how prosecutors
made charging decisions or document their role in sentencing.2 18 Significantly,
organizations that seek to improve the criminal justice system work with
prosecutors' offices in various cities and collect data to examine policies and
practices. 2 19 But thus far, little data has been gathered on the granular level that
examines prosecutorial decision-making at the charging stage.
211. Richman opines, "If the characteristic fault of German prosecutors is to deny that there is any discretion
to explain" (because at least in principle they operate on the doctrine of legality), "that of American
prosecutors-and it's probably more grievous-is to offer scant explanation for starkly discretionary
decisions." RICHMAN, Accounting for Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 25.
212. See, e.g., CROWN ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 208.
213. See id. at 18.
214. See id.
215. 2011 National Survey of Prosecutors, NORC AT U. OF CHI., http://www.norc.org/Research/Projects/
Pages/2011-national-survey-of-prosecutors.aspx [https://perma.cc/6D4H-D8GZ].
216. The National Center for State Courts collects data about the operation of state courts that includes case
filings, dispositions, and related data. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURrs, http://www.courtstatistics.org/
[https://perma.cc/6NB4-Z4FG] (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
217. NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS Assoc., AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR
PROSECUTORS: FINDINGS FROM THE APPLICATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN Two PROSECUTORS' OFFICES 1
(Apr. 2007), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/performance-measures-findings_07.pdf [https://perma.cclRU8Q-969R].
218. Brian Elderbroom et al., Assessing the Impact of South Dakota's Sentencing Reforms:
Justice Reinvestment Initiatives, URBAN INST. (May 2016), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/
assessing-impact-south-dakotas-sentencing-reforms-justice-reinvestment-initiative [https://perma.cc/3LLT-DY
5W].
219. For example, the Vera Institute collects and analyzes data in six jurisdictions to develop policies to
reduce racial and ethnic disparities in prosecutorial decision-making. Prosecution and Racial Jus-
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Aside from the insulation-intentional or otherwise-that this gives to
prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors cannot exercise their proper role as minis-
ters or administrators of justice without understanding what the office is actually
doing and the impact of what is being done. Certainly, no standards, guidelines,
or policies can be effective without reliable data;220 nor can systemic impacts be
evaluated or avoided if there is no way to track or identify them. Arguably, the
failure to track the impact of prosecutorial charging procedures contributed to the
mass incarceration problem-no one was keeping track. Certainly, other
injustices-such as occurred in Kings County, where a series of prosecutors
presumably relied on the same incredible witness to prosecute a series of
unrelated homicides 22 1-could not have happened with adequate internal data
controls.
The information that is missing as to charging, for example, and that should be
kept, should include at a minimum case-level data on the following:
* Names and identity of police and other law enforcement personnel
involved; personnel history of law enforcement officials;
* Charges at arrest; charges at arraignment; charges dropped or dismissed,
if any, and why;
* Data on the defendant, including race, age, social, professional, educa-
tional, psychological, and other information;
* The same personal data on the victim, relationship to the defendant and to
law enforcement, and the nature of the harm;
* Relationship(s), if any, between police and defendant and police and
victim;
* What collateral consequences were considered; what alternative disposi-
tions and diversion programs were considered and why they were or were
not chosen; any special sentencing outcomes (mandatory minimums, gun
enhancements, predicate felony laws) that were threatened, even if later
dropped;
* Charges at plea;
* Plea offers made;
* Prior criminal record of defendant, victim, and witnesses;
tice Program, VERA INST OF JUSTICE, archive.vera.org/centers/prosecution-and-racial-justice-program [https://
perma.cc/E7AM-G465] (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
220. That is, "[w]e cannot understand what we cannot measure, and we cannot change what we cannot
understand." American Bar Association and NAACP Legal Defense Fund Joint Statement on Eliminating Bias
in the Criminal Justice System (July 16, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/about-us/ABA-LDF%20Joint%2
OStatement%20on%20Eliminating%2OBias%20in%20the%2OCriminal%2OJustice%2OSystem.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XV6N-D4DF].
221. David A. Love, Dirty Ex-Cop Louis Scarcella's Framing of Innocent Black Men Is Costing NYC
Millions, GRIO (Jan. 14, 2015), http://thegrio.com/2015/01/14/louis-scarcella-nypd-wrongful-convictions/
[https://perma.cc/44VP-QGAP].
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* Race, gender, level of experience, prior disciplinary action, reversal, or
other judicial mention of the ADA;
* Race, gender, status (private, institutional public, court appointed), level
of experience, prior disciplinary action, reversal, or other judicial
mention of defense counsel; and status of defense counsel (private,
public, court-appointed, etc.);
* Number of appearances before disposition; reasons for adjournments;
and
* Manner of disposition and sentence.
Establishing a system to collect such data is feasible in this digital world.2 2 2 Of
course, developing systems to gather such data can be costly and time
consuming, and prosecutors may express reluctance to provide such data to the
public about the inner workings of their offices. However, working through
criminal justice policy organizations or in public-private partnerships to establish
systems to collect such information is likely to be the most productive and cost
efficient method. Practical complaints are no longer an excuse. Proposals for
online case review of systems suggest data collection points can be established so
that "individual judges and prosecutors will be able to create, map, and view the
heuristics they use to make decisions about cases."2 23
CONCLUSION
The dysfunction of our criminal justice system is widely reported with a focus
upon "mass incarceration." The number of people charged with crimes and
serving time in U.S. prisons is unprecedented. Moreover, there is an increasing
focus upon other ills in the system, including the disproportionate punishment of
poor people of color; the lack of meaningful public defense funding; the
increasing number of wrongful convictions; the detention of defendants because
they have no money for bail; internationally unprecedented severe sentences,
including the mandatory minimums that enable prosecutors to secure question-
able guilty pleas and judges to impose excessively harsh sentences; the
inaccurate administrative system in misdemeanor court; and the destructive
social impact of collateral consequences.
There are many causes for these disturbing conditions. Congress and the state
legislatures enacted severe sentencing statutes-longer sentences, mandatory
minimums-that made our already punitive sentencing scheme ever more
punitive, and gave prosecutors uniquely powerful weapons in securing guilty
pleas or for financing the expansion of police powers. Overcriminalization,
222. See Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access,
Fairness, and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 209-10 (2016) (arguing for OCR systems where some
cases are resolved online rather than in person).
223. Id. at 213.
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defunding of diversion programs, privatization of prisons, and increased parole
violations all exacerbate the problem and the interaction of many of these
phenomena have led to our current problems.
But surprisingly, in looking for the causes and cures for the mass incarceration
state, very little, if any, attention has been paid to the role of the most powerful
actor in the criminal justice system: the prosecutor. Remarkably, we now know
that the major cause of the explosion in our prison population is aggressive
prosecutorial charging practices. Necessarily, prosecutorial practices should
change to prevent a continuation, or a worsening, of mass incarceration.
How should this occur? Changes in the criminal justice process can best be
achieved internally, by internal guidelines or by otherwise changing the cultures
of the various players in the process, rather than primarily through external
judicial or legislative directives. By examining the multi-faceted role of the
prosecutor not only in an adversary role or an administrative one, but as a
minister of justice, this Article suggests changes in prosecutorial practices that
require a prosecutor's office to: (1) re-calibrate the minister of justice and
advocacy balance in recognition of the current mass incarceration crisis-the
prosecutorial role as an advocate at trial differs from prosecutors' gatekeeping
role in making charging decisions; (2) ensure independence from law enforce-
ment in the charging function as required by the ABA Standards, in part through
the use of written standards, checklists, and forms; (3) collect currently
non-existent, objective data that breaks down and memorializes available
information on each decision to charge as well as its consequences; and (4) help
to draft written charging procedures and policies based on the collection of that
data-driven information.
The documented impact of charging practices on the problem of mass
incarceration requires a frank and realistic look at the prosecutor's charging
function and the charging culture. Greater transparency, independence, and
written procedures based on accurate and complete data would help prosecutors
fulfill their powerful minister of justice function.
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